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In hls masterful 1944 manífesto, Haavelmo tried to convince
econometriclans of the idea that methodology and appraisal of (economic)
theoríes are a fundamentally probabilistic matter. He helped to provide
foundations for identifying, estimating and testing simultaneous economic
relations. Haavelmo and his colleagues at the Cowles Commission were very
successful, but one issue turned out to be overwhelmingly more difficult
to solve than expected: the cholce of the "best" economlc theory or
econometric model. This is of interest for econometricians as well as for
those involved in the methodology of economics. This paper is primarily
addressed to the latter group. The statistical and econometric literature
on testing non-nested hypotheses proves to be of interest for economic
methodology. Hence, the probabtllty approach in economic methodology is a
natural successor to Haavelmo's probabiltty approach in econometrics.
Obvious as this may sound to those familiar with probabilistic inference,
this is a fairly new message for economic methodologists. For bad
reasons, philosophy of science and economíc methodology treated
statistical inference as not theír cup of tea. This led to an artifícial
distinction between probabilistic and non-probabilistíc inference.
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1. Introduction
Despite hís aversion for publicity and fame, the 1989 Nobel Memorial
prize in Economics was awarded to the econometrícian Trygve Haavelmo.
This honours his contributions to econometrícs, especially his supplement
to the 1944 edition of Econometrica, The Probabllity Approach in
Econometrics. Haavelmo provided the first thorough analysis of how
probability methods could and should be used Sn economics. His work
extended Tinbergen's efforts to specify, estimate and test simultaneous
mo~iels Sn economics.Z Flowever, we will not evaluate here his work on the
statistícs of systems of equations, but instead focus on another íssue:
the use of probabilíty theory in economic ínference.
Haavelmo emphasized the need for proper probabilíty theory in
econometrics. At the time, the most popular and most developed
probability theory was the frequentist methodology. The methods of
Neyman, Pearson and Fisher, the leading statisticians of the day, were
extended to the econometrics domain, and many successful results emerged.
Hence, this resulted ín a legacy that emphasized frequentist probability
techniques for empirical research.
Model ídentificatíon was among the most important issues addressed by
Haavelmo (other contributors were Working, Frisch, Tinbergen and
Marschak, to mention ~ust a few). The problem was how empirical
observations could be used to trace structural equatíons, such as a
demand function, where demand depends on prices. As supply depends on
prices as well, and only equilibrium poínts (where demand equals supply)
are observed, ít was not immedlately clear how empirical data related to
economíc theory, i.e. how data on príces and quantitíes could ldentify
theoretícal relations such as the demand functíon. The well known rank
and order conditions provlded a solutlon to this problem. Prior
Z Of course, Haavelmo was not alone ín hís efforts. The members of the
Cowles Commission ín particular were actívely involved in this research
programme. Theír actívities were comparable with a political struggle,
Haavelmo provided the party manifesto. The developments that led to
Haavelmo's manífesto are discussed in Morgan (1990).2
restríctions were needed for identifícation. Initially, this was not
really a probabilisfic issue, as ít was assumed that these restrictions
were given by Economic Theory, with absolute certainty. As soon as this
assumption became suspect the probability approach in econometrics lost
some of its appeal. Haavelmo's foundations became questíonable.
The early hopes of the famous Cowles Commission (of which Haavelmo was
a member from 1943 to 1947) were very optimistíc, but quickly
undermined. The immediate goal was to come with definite models of the
economy that could be used to guide policy. WSthout much hesitation, the
dírector of the Cowles Commission could write his research agenda for
the near future3:
1945-6: work on method(ology) to be completed in the main;
1946-8: final application of inethod to business cycle hypotheses and
to (detailed) single market problems;
1948-9: discussion of policy. Extension to international economics;
(J. Marschak, 1944 memorandum to Socíal Science Research Committee,
quoted in Epstein 1987, p. 62). A similar agenda would work for the
development of the atomic bomb, but statistical evaluation of economic
theories turned out to be not that easy, not to speak of social
engineering4.
Controversies on the appropriate inferential method, the statistical
model and economic theory continued. The fundamental problem of theory
appraisal was never really solved. It became evident that there was more
uncertainty then initially expected: the problem was not just to estimate
a given model, but also to choose the model to start with. Haavelmo
delegated this problem to the economic theorists (1944, p. 71), and
invoked what Leamer (1978) dubbed the "axíom of correct specification" to
J This research agenda corresponds to what (,akatos (1970) calls the
"positive heurístic" of a research programme. See below.
4 It is fair to say that the amount of money spent on the making of the
atomic bomb is incomparable to the money spent on the development of
econometrics: Rhodes (1986) provides an astonishing account of the
magnitude and economic costs of thls piece of physical
engineering.3
justify further probabilistic i nferences.
Despite such shortcomings, there is little doubt that Haavelmo and hís
Cowles colleagues convinced most of the econometric profession with the
claim that proper probabílity foundations were a necessary condition for
good inference. On the other hand, those who studied methodology of
economics (from a philosophy of science perspective) were not overly
impressed and neglected most of econometrics and statistics. One reason
might be that the original research agenda had little to say about model
appraisal, the problem of inethodology. Still, this ís a weak excuse,
certaínly today but also during the early years of econometrícs.
Probabilistic inference is so obviously a candidate for appraisal of
theories that one needs good reasons to neglect ít. It is doubtful that
such reasons exíst. And if reasons can be found, they should be givenb.
Furthermore, one would like to see alternatives. In a recent discussion
on such alternatíves for dealing wíth uncertainty (í.e. fuzzy logic and
artificíal intelligence), Lindley (1987) made the same assertlon as
Haavelmo did: the only satlsfactory description of uncertainty is
províded by probability theory, as no better methods are available.7
Hence, íf there is uncertainty about theories, it ís best expressed ín
probabilístic terms. The specification and appraisal of economic models
can be Snterpreted in this light.
This paper evaluates the scope and limits of probability methods ín
economic methodology. Nhat may someone who is interested in economic
5 This "axiom" was first put forward by R.A. Fisher; Koopmans referred to
lt as "Físher's axiom of correct specification" ín 1937 (see Spanos
(1989, p. 411)).
6 Of course, theories are not on1 evaluated from the y polnt of view of
empirical evidence. Conceptual lssues are important as well. Still, a
theory that has no empirical support whatsoever is not a very attractive
one.
7 However, Shafer (1987) disagrees by givíng more credit to the
artificlal intelligence program. As far as I am aware, there are no
applicatlons of fuzzy logic, and hardly any applications of artlficlal
intelligence, to empirical economlcs. See also the paper by Swamy et.al.
(1985), who try to reconcile fuzzy logic wlth Bayesian probability theory.4
methodology learn from the econometric literature on testing economic
theories? More than seems to be suggested by most of the methodological
literature. Furthermore, the problems of econometric inference did
already pop up in the early days of the subject, hence it ls interesting
to see how they were treated then, and now. This part of Haavelmo's
legacy ls worth investigating in detail.
The paper is organized as folloxs. Section 2 of this paper starts with
a brief overview of some ideas in philosophy of science. Section 3 starts
with a discussion of probabilistic foundations of economic inference. In
section 4 we discuss the problem of observational equivalence of rival
models. Section 5 deals with statistical inference, and the difference
between the frequentist and the Bayesian approach ln probabilíty theory.
Section 6 deals with testing, comparing and appraising rival hypotheses.
Sectíon 7 concludes the paper.
2. A Short Detour on Philosophy of Science
Science involves formulating and appraising hypotheses, theories (sets
of hypotheses), or research programmes ("theories in development", see
Lakatos 1970 and below). Ideally, one would like to obtain a definite
solution for scientific problems, but usually there are several competíng
theoretical explanations. In that case, we must try to fínd the best or
most useful explanation available. Therefore, we need methods to evaluate
theories.
Philosophy of science, the discipline that takes a closer look at such
appraísal, was dominated for some time by the ideas of Popper (1959). He
ampi~asized the notion of crucial tests (tests leading to complete
re~ectlon) and logical falsit1ab11ity in evaluating theoríes. Popper's
philosophy ís problematic for many reasons (see e.g. Hausman 1989), but
it. is evident that crucial tests in economies are rare or do not exist at
all. Furthermore, the essence of probabilistíc theories is that they
regard events as improbable, not imposslble (events with probabilíty
zero). Logical falsifíability relates to the latter case but is not of
much interest for the former. Hence probabilístic inference is better
suited for scientifíc appraisal than non-probabilistic inference.5
Popper's student, Lakatos, tried to overcome some of the problems of
Popperian methodology. He dropped the crucial test and instead emphasized
the dynamics of theory development. Hence, Lakatos ( 1970) substituted
research programmes for Popper's theories. A theory, 9, is ~ust one
ínstance of a research programme, ~~, at a gíven point in time. A
falsification of J is not automatically a rejectíon of Yt~. Falsifying a
theory was replaced by measuring the degree of "progressiveness" of an
~2P. A programme is theoretícally progresslve if succeeding theoríes
predict novel facts (facts unforeseen by earlíer theories). The programme
ís empirícally progressive if these predictíons are realized.
But Lakatos's suggestion of appraising theories by comparing their rate
of progressiveness or degeneration i s not easily applied to economics. A
research programme i s a rather vague notion. Scíentists may disagree
about what belongs to a specífic ~~ and what does not (see Feyerabend,
1975). For example, if we replace the theory of diminishing marginal
utílity of money by a successor, whích combínes this theory with the
general theory of relativity, we seem to make a"progressive" step. Of
course, thís is not what Lakatos had in mind: in order to avoid such
nonsense-progression he íntroduced the hard core. The hard core defines
the generai principles which are indisputable, at least among the
adherents of a particular research programme. Lakatos's hard core is of
some help, but is insuffícíent to define what exactly belongs to the
theory. An alternative to avoid the above-mentíoned nonsensical
conjunctíon of two theories is to introduce the notion of trrelevant
conjunction (for a discussíon, with a Bayesian solutíon to the problem,
see Rosenkrantz ( 1983)).
It is difficult to define the "hard core" of a programme without
arbitraríness. Competing programmes may apply to partly non-overlapping
are~a of interest. This leads to we" known problAms as Incommen-
surabtlity (Kuhn's (1962) notíon that new theories give new
interpretations of events, and even to the language descríbing these
events), and to the Duhem-Quine problem ( one ís never sure just what ís
being tested, the hypothesís of interest or an auxilíary hypothesís).
Furthermore, whereas Popper stíll made an (unsuccessful) attempt to
contribute to the theory of probabilistic ínference ( cf. hls propensity
theory of probability), Lakatos has a rather condescendíng attitude
towards this subject. Both of them reject i nductive reasoning.6
The phílosopher Nancy Cartwright (1983) has made clear that the
relation between pure theory, a model and measured varíables is not at
all as well defined as one would like to see. She emphasizes that
explanatory theories (fundamental laws) Sn physics are always false,
strictly spoken (compare Lakatos's díctum: "all theories are born
refuted"). Instead, phenomenologlcal laws are empirically informative.
There ís a trade-off between explanatory power and empirícal validity
(Cartwríght 1983, p. 3):
We have detailed expertise for testing the claim of physícs about
what happens in concrete sítuations. When we look to the real
ímplications of our fundamental laws, they do not meet these ordinary
standards. (...) When ít comes to the test, fundamental laws are far
worse off than the phenomenologícal laws they are supposed to
explain."
Speaking of laws in economics may be mísleading, therefore we call them
models, A1.8 It Ss clear that Al relates to R~, but this relatlon is not
one of logícal, strictly deductive, entailment.
Take, for example, Ian Hacking's short history of the discovery and
lnterpretatíon of Faraday's magneto-optical effect. In the 19th century,
G. B. Airy:
"showed how to represent St (the Faraday effectl analytically withln
the wave theory of light. The equations for líght had contained some
second derivatíves of displacement with respect to time. Airy
assessed some ad hoc further terms, either first or third
derivatives. This is a standard move in physics. In order to make the
equattons fit the phenomena, you pull from the shelf some falrly
standard extra terms for the equatlons, without knowing why one
rather than ar~ther will do the trtck." (Hacking 1983 p. 211,
emphasis added) .
8 Cartwright (1983) dístínguishes pure theoríes, models and
phenomenological laws because her maín interest is to criticize
scientifír. realísm. Her poínt is that "phenomenologícal laws are índeed
true of the objects In realíty -or might be; but the fundamental laws are
true only of objects in the model." (op.cít. p.4). We are less interested
in the problem of scíentiflc realism and more in the problem of testing
or comparing economic theories. These comparisons take place at the level
of empírícal models whích are related to developing theories. Lakatos's
term research programme serves this goal better than fundamental laws do,
and we wlll use the word model in the sense of Cartwrlght's
phenomenological law. The dynamics of statlstícal inference falls under
the heading of modelling.
9 Airy could not explain the Faraday effect, he only could give a good7
Hence, theories in physícs are often enriched with additional elements,
not contained in the pure theory. That sounds familiar to the economist.
But if pure theories are wrong anyway, if we are a prlorl certain they
are, then does ít make sense to use probability methods to evaluate them?
The answer is yes. Even if we know that the pure theory is false,
stríctly spoken, we would like to know how well the theory represents
realityl0
The Popper-Lakatos tradition (still alive at LSE in the person of John
Watkins, and in economics defended by Mark Blaug and Joop Klant) has lost
ground to alternative philosophies of science. Some of them are hardly
worth the label "philosophy" (e.g. Caldwell 1982, who does not pretend to
provide a true alternative philosophy but may be interpreted as a warning
against followíng dogmatically a one-sided philosophy such as Popper's),
but others are true attempts to solve the deep methodological problems.
Particularly since the seventies, probabilistic reasoning is in the
philosophical picture. Howson and Urbach (1989) provide a comprehensive
treatment of a probabilistic phílosophy of science (from a Bayesian
perspective). In the following sections, we will discuss the validity of
probabilístic inference in economics.
3. Economic Inference and Probability
Haavelmo's argument to defend the use of probabilistic inference
closely resembles Hacking's point or Cartwright's emphasis on the
importance of phenomenological laws. The following quotation (Haavelmo
t944, p. iv) makes this clear.
"In fact, if we consider actual economíc research -even that carried
out by people who oppose the use of probability schemes- we find that
description of what happened. It was Lorentz who provided a theoretical
explanation in terms of electron theory. Cartwríght (1983, p.2) calls
Airy's analysís a phenomenological law, and Lorentz's explanation a
theoretical law.
10 Compare Box (1979): "All models are wrong but some are useful".a
it rests, ultimately, upon some, perhaps very vague, notion of
probability and random variables. For whenever we apply a theory to
facts we do not -and we do not expect to- obtaln exact agreement.
Certaln dlscrepancies are classSfied as "admisslble", others as
"practically impossíble" under the assumptions of the theory. And the
prtnclple of such classification is ítself a theoretical scheme,
namely one in whích the vague expressions "practlcally imposslble" or
"almost certain" are replaced by "the probability is near to zero", or
"the probability ís near to one".
This is nothíng but a convenient way of expressing opiníons about
real phenomena. But the probabílity concept has the advantage that ít
ís "analytic", we can derive new statements from it by the rules of
logíc. Thus, starting from a purely formal probability model involving
certain probabílities which themselves may not have any counterparts
in real life, we may derive such statements as "The probability of A
is almost equal to 1". Substituting some real phenomena for A, and
transforming the statement "a probability near to 1" into "we are
almost sure that A will occur", we have a statement about a real
phenomenon, the truth of which can be tested."
Let us now see exactly how probability enters economics. First of all,
human behaviour, the underlying determinant of economic data, is to a
degree erratic. This is the unexplained part of behaviour which can be
modelled in probabillstic terms. This randomness may be due to human
nature or, for example, to the fact that behaviour of rational
individuals depends partly on their expectatlons of future states of the
world.
Secondly, the variables that are part of the theoretical model have to
be matched with observational counterparts. This match may be imperfect,
with "noise" enteríng due to the fact that only approxímate variables can
be observed. Measurement error was Haavelmo's main reason for ínvoking
probability theory. A related issue is the seperation of ob,Ject and
subject whích hampers, for example, empirical research to the permanent
income hypothesis. The econometriclan has to ídentify permanent shocks Sn
indivídual incomes from observed data, whereas individuals often know
already before the actual shock occurs that it is imminent. The result
may be that the econometriclan falsely rejects the theory (see Campbell
1987 for an excellent treatment of thís problem).
Thirdly, the theoretical form of the model may leave room for many
interpretations. In theoretical models, functional forms are often left
unspecífied, and constraints such as concavíty and stability conditions
may be all that are available. The emplrical model will always be
mis-speclfted, to some degree. For example "economic nature" may be a9
highly nonlinear system of dynamic equations, whereas the model is a
linear simplification of this system. Haavelmo (1944, p. 71)) left this
specifícation problem to economic theory: "Let [f] be our economic theory
to be tested, the random variables having certain prescrlbed distributlon
properties. The principal task of economic theory is to make a frultful
choice of the torms f." Modern developments in econometrics brought this
problem within the realm of econometrics (two different approaches are
mis-specification testíng (e.g. Hausman (1978)) or specification search
(Leamer 1978))I1
Fourthly, the theoretical model may simply be wrong. Not only, as noted
before, because theoretical models, even in physics, are always wrong.
Also, from a purely logical point of view, if there are two rival
explanations for some empirical occurrences, whích are partly or fully
exclusive to each other, then not both of them can be "true" at the same
tíme.
Hence we have four sources of uncertainty: a probabilistic nature,
measurement error, speciflcation error and theory uncertainty. Given
these sources of uncertaínty, probabílistlc methods may prove invaluable
to glve the theories empirical relevance, to quantífy their match with
the data. In section 4 below, two dífferent probabilistíc methodologies
are discussed: the frequenttst and the Bayestan one. The underlying
philosophies are quite different. Haavelmo adopted the frequentist
approach to probabilistic inference, but we will see that there are some
11
Spanos (1989) argues that Haavelmo is a forerunner of the
"Spanos-approach to econometrícs", in which the emplrical economic model
and statistical model are distínct. This leads to the mystical claim that
"At the statistical-model level, testing the underlying assumptions
constítutes proper misspecification testing, but at the emplrical-model
level, the same tests can only be described as "diagnostlc checking"."
(Spanos 1989, p. 423). This kínd of schízophrenla ís absent in Haavelmo
(1944). Haavelmo's probability foundation does not relate to testing the
valídlty of the statistícal model, but relates primarily to the
probabílistíc analysis of a simultaneous model, i.e. the ~oint p.d.f..
It also is prepostorous to see in Haavelmo an early LSE-style
econometrícian, í.e. one ín the tradition of Sargan and Hendry. Two
key-stones of thís tradition are extensive testing, and specífying sound
short- and long term dynamics of a model. There is nothing whatsoever Sn
Haavelmo's work to validate Spanos's suggestion that the Nobel-laureate
may be regarded as a honourable member of this school in econometrics.10
implicitly Bayesian ídeas in his work as ve1112. Of course, this doesn't
make him a Bayesian hero.
It is ínteresting to see hox Haavelmo formulated his programme (1944,
PP. 8-9):
"That is, the model will have an economic meaníng only xhen
assocíated with a deslgn of actual experlments that describes -and
Sndicates how to measure- a system of "true" variables (or ob~ects)
xl, x2. .. , x~ that are to be identified with the corresponding
variables in the theory. (...) The model thereby becomes an a prlori
hypothesls about real phenomena, stating that every system of values
that we might observe of the "true" variables will be one that
belongs to the set of value-systems that is admissible xithin the
model. (...) Hypotheses in the above sense are thus the ~oínt
implícatíons -and the only testable lmplications, as far as
observatlons are concerned- of a theory and a deslgn of
experiments.It is then natural to adopt the convention that a theory
ís called true or false according as the hypotheses implled are true
or false, when tested agalnst the data chosen as the "true"
variables. Then ve may speak, ínterchangeably, about testing
hypotheses or testing theories."
Haavelmo's methodology seems thus a fairly straightforxard implemen-
tatíon of the modus tollens (if the model is re~ected, then the
underlying theory Ss rejected):
M(9.D): Al - {H) , -lt ~ -(9.D) (3.1)
where (9,D), the theory and the experimental design, defines the model,
and {H) denotes the set of a priori hypotheses Smplied by the model. The
- slgn is the logícal operator "not true". The sign ~ is used to denote a
relation for probabilistic inference to dístinguish it from a purely
logical (deductive) relation (of course it does not indlcate convergence
in probabílity).
Above it was argued that the relation betxeen theory and empirical
model ís more diffuse than 3.1 suggests13. It is better to replace :I, the
lZ Not unlike Fisher's ínterpretatíon of probabílity. Físher accepted
probabllity as a measure of evídence, whereas Neyman re~ected such an
interpretatíon.
13
This point is not entirely neglected by Haavelmo, note The Meaning of11
theory ín 3.1, by a research programme ~~.14 The statistical rejectíon of
a hypothesis may inspire an adjustment in the R~ and not to the re~ection
of a theory (see Barten and Keuzenkamp, forthcoming). Statístical
inference is a process of learning, not a once and for all decislon. At a
given point ln time, thís ínference results in a favourite model M(t),
which is the one that survives the feedback process of selection and
variation. Of course, there may be more of such models. If two competing
models emerge, then the first Sssue that arises is to see if data can
discriminate between the models. This point is related to the
identification problem, extensively discussed in Haavelmo (1944).
This ídentification problem, at least as it was discussed lnítíally,
points to a very specifíc characteristíc of the occurrence of probability
in economics: simultaneíty. In economíc relations, everything depends on
everything. A demand equation has prices as right hand side variables,
but these prices depend again on the quantities demanded and supplied.
This basic problem, inherent to economics, makes probabilístic Snference
in economics more difficult than straightforward philosophical
discussions of probabilístíc ínference would suggest. Hence we will deal
wíth this problem ín some more detaíl in the next section.
4. Identífication and Observational Equivalence
The identification problem belongs to the most interesting toplcs in
econometrics. Haavelmo made signifícant contributions to the solution of
the problem: he discussed the order and rank condition in a very general
way. Closely related to ídentífícatíon is observational equivalence. For
example, if a demand functíon and a supply function are not identlfied,
then estímation of one of them is observationally equivalent to
the Phrase 'To Formulate Theorles by Looking at the Data', section 17 of
Haavelmo (1944). See also below.
14 .í.he term research programme remains a vague one. If an ~~ has any
empirical meaning at all, than we may interpret it as the model
space. Below, we make an effort to provlde a Bayesian account of an R~.12
estimatíng the other. The same can occur when testing ríval models, say
M1 and MZ. Either model provides a set of varíables and functional
relations in the context of a stochastic scheme to explain the dependent
variables, y. Thus, we have two densities, p(y~Ml) and p(yl~ ). We define
observatíonal equivalence as:
p(Y~M1) - P(Y~Mz) (3.1)
which says that the data look identícal, whether the first or the second
"wíndow" ís used. The data cannot discrimínate between the models. One
reason may be the fact that the structure of the models differs, but the
models as they are to be estimated are the same. The reduced forms of the
models are then equívalent. The problem was recognized in the early days
of econometrics, wíth Haavelmo discussíng it at length in his (1944)
essay. He presented the order and rank conditions for identification, but
his interest was not in comparing models but in showing under what
conditions one would be allowed to give structural interpretations to
parameters. For example, if prices and quantities are correlated, it is
not necessary that this relation represents a demand function: if
identifícation conditions are not fulfilled, then the estimated function
could as well be a supply func~ion. Thís problem was díscussed by Working
ín the 1920s.
An interesting example of observatíonal equivalence of rival models is
presented in Sargent (1976), who shoxs an implication of Lucas's (1976)
critique on econometric policy evaluation. The idea is this. There may
exist two competing ~~s, ~~ and ~~Z, which have very different
characteristics but yet are indistínguishable if they are translated to
empírícal models. The estimated parameters do not reveal whether they
identífy the first or second theory. In Sargent's example, one theory has
Keynesian features (discretionary monetary feedback rules can be used to
reduce unemployment), and the other has monetarist features (money cannot
have long term real effects). Assume that, according to model one,
changes in last year's money supply changes current unemployment, whereas
the other model argues that only unanticipated changes matter. The
underlying theories are very dífferent but, in the absence of other
information, a model that estimates unemployment condltional on past
money does not say anything at all about the validity of one or the other13
model. In the extreme case that individuals have perfect foreslght, that
is, they know any change in the polícy rule, St is Smpossible to infer
with statistical methods whlch model Ss "true". In other cases,
additional prior ínformation, such as the dynamics of the economy or the
distribution of unanticipated shocks, is needed in order to identify the
parameters of a model. The use of such prior information, and anyway the
questíon "4lhere does the model come from", has led to txo different
approaches in the theory of probabilíty: the frequentist and the
Bayesían. These, and theír relevance for a probability approach in the
methodology of economícs, are discussed in the next section.
S. Statistical Inference: the Frequentist and Bayesian Approach in
Probability Theory
In section 3 we saw that Haavelmo delegated the choice of fruitful
models to test to economic theory. Hence, according to his methodology,
the model is given to the statlstician. This is also the starting point
for the frequentist approach to statistícal inference, at least this was
the situation around 1940.
The frequentist theory relates a model dlrectly to the outsíde world
(i.e. the data) via an "objective" mechanísm. Furthermore, this theory ís
founded upon the occurrence of repetitive events, a class to which theory
appraisal does not belong. Von Mises, one of the founders of frequency
theory, claims that '...if one talks of the probability that the two
poems known as the Iliad and the Odyssey have the same author, no
references to a prolonged sequence of cases is possible and ít hardly
wakes ~cusa to assign a numerical value to such a conjecture." (cited in
Barnett 1973, p. 8). Similarly, theory appraísal has often been excluded
l,y adherents of the frequentist approach. A theory ls rlght or it is
false, if it is false then it 1s not a valid base for probabilistíc
iní'erence.
Frequentist theory assumes that there is no uncertainty wíth respect to
the parameters of a model: the "true" parameters are fixed quantities,14
the only problem is that we cannot observe them directly.lS To make
inferential statements, the frequentist needs to assert beforehand that
one model is "true" (Leamer's axiom of correct specification). That is a
remarkable assumption íf two competing theories, which are a prtori
equally valuable, are evaluated. Either, the frequentist who wants to
evaluate such theories has to take the foundations of frequentist
probabílíty theory with a grain of salt, or inference is not necessary as
it is already knoun that one or the other model is true.l6
The Bayesian perspective is different. Repetitive events and truth are
not the starting points for ínference, but rather degrees of belief or
betting ratíos. For a Bayesian, the model is a useful window from which
to view the world, and probability ís the measure of uncertainty. If new
data become available, they are used to revise the uncertainty. Hence,
the Bayesian perspectlve emphasízes conslstent sequential learning. The
Bayesian is not ínterested ín the properties of a hypothetical infinite
number of random drawings fro:n some population, but only ln the
data-information as it is avaílable. Prior informatíon (or degrees of
belief) are combíned with new information to obtain posterior beliefs.
All statements are conditional on this (prior and data) information.
Bayesian methods have often been criticized, particularly because of
their dependence on prior probabilitíes. In the world of frequentist
probabilíty, such prior information should have the form of known
frequencies. In that case, there is no reason to distinguish the "prior"
from sample information. In other cases, a frequentist will reject any
15
Mises (1957, p. 158) disagrees: "I do not understand the many beautiful
words used by Fisher and hís followers ín support of the likelihood
theory. The main argument, namely, that p is not a variable hiit an
"unknown constant", does not mean anything to me." Mises does not provide
an alternative inspiration for economists in their practical statistical
work Snsofar they work with small samples: Mises vehemently critíclzes
small sampie theory. And, as we Just saw, using probabilíty for
epistemologlcal interence ls also unwarranted in the eyes of Mises.
Furthermore, St must be said that speaking of the frequentist approach
can be dangerous: notable dífferences between frequentist interpretations
(such as Neyman's, Fisher's or Mlses's) exist (see Jeffreys 1961).
16
In section 6 below, the issue of non-nested testing is dlscussed in
detail. Some recent frequentist approaches to this problem drop the
assumption that one of the models should be regarded as "true", but at
signlficant costs (loss of power).15
use of príor information. For example, probabílistic prior ignorance is a
contradiction in terms, if the terms are dictated by the frequentist. A
Bayesian, who thinks ín terms of belíefs not frequencies, does not have
such hesitation, particularly after the formalization províded by
Jeffreys (1961). It is true, though, that Bayeslan "Sgnorance" has to
obey some very strlct rules. The Bayesian re~oinder to the frequentlst
school is that you cannot do without these prior probabilitles if you
want to answer basíc ínferential questions.
Most of modern econometrics stems from the frequentist traditlon. The
statístical theory of point estimation, estimatíon of confidence
intervals and "hypothesis testíng", developed among others by Fisher,
Neyman and Pearson, were introduced into econometrics by Haavelmo in
1944. Of course, some of these statlstical methods had already been
applied by other econometrlcians, but Haavelmo provided probabillstic
foundations for theír use ín interdependent systems of equations. First,
he had to justify the use of a mathematical theory of repetitive events,
for St was not immedíately clear how unique economic data could be
interpreted as such. Haavelmo (1944, p. S1) invented a clever way out:
"There is no logical difficulty involved in considering the "whole
population as a sample", for the class of populatíons we are dealing
with does not consists of an infinity of different individuals, 1t
consists of an infinity of possible decislons which might be taken
with respect to the value of y. And all the decisions taken by all
the lndividuals who were present during one year, say, may be
considered as one sample, all the decisions taken by, perhaps, the
same índívlduals during another year may be consldered as another
sample, and so forth. From this point of víew we may consíder the
total number of possíble observations (the total number of declsíons
to consume A by all índivíduals) as result of a samplíng procedure,
which Nature is carrying out, and which we merely watch as passive
observers."
Haavelmo needed this metaphysical ~ustificatlon because at the time
there were no real alternative methods of inference. The Bayesian
approach was highly suspect. The leading statistlcians of the prewar era
re~ected the Bayesian methodology (although Neyman became more positive
towards the Bayeslan approach some twenty years later, and Fisher
developed a quasi Bayesian method called fiductal lnference (see Barnett
1973)). The first edition of Jeffreys's Bayesian Theory of Probablllty
appeared in 1939 and it took a considerable amount of time before this
book was recognized as a significant contribution to the theory of16
probability. Haavelmo hardly could and certaínly díd not make use of
Jeffreys's work. Stlll, he gives support to what may be regarded as an
ímplicitly Bayesian interpretation of statistics (1944, p. 48)17.
"we considered "frequency of occurrence" as a practical counterpart
to probability. But ín many cases such an interpretation would seem
rather artificíal, e.g., for economic time series where a repetition
of the "experiment", in the usual sense, ís not possible or feasible.
Here we might then, alternatively, interpret "probability" simply as
a measure of our a prtort confldence in the occurrence of a certaín
event."
In the present paper we want to see how this relates to "confidence in
competing hypotheses or models", an issue not directly addressed by
Haavelmo but a logical complement to hís work.
The question for the next section is how two rival models, M1 and 2,
can be compared. First, we have to find out how to obtain them. This is
the domain of statistlcal modelling, an issue large and difficult enough
for a separate PhD-thesis18.
A problem closely related to statistícal modelling is the validity of
statistical tests of hypotheses if a theory is false anyway. In the
background of hypothesis testing lingers a matntatned hypothests: that
part of the theory that remains unquestioned. For example, this may be
assumption of valid condltíoning, the axiom of correct specificatlon.
Haavelmo relies on such an assumption (1944, p. 74, see also p. 71):
"This means that we are sure -or that we accept without test- that the
theory is all ríght so far as the forms of the functions f are
concerned." It is the task of economic theory to make fruitful choices of
the forms f.
The statístical methods of modelling and hypothesís testing lead to a
problem that occurs íf there ís only one sample from which to Snfer both
the form of the model and the estimates of the parameters. Thís is known
17 This comes fairl close to Fisher's ínter retation of y p probability: a
measure of evidence. There is a strong dífference between Fisher on the
one hand and Neyman and Pearson on the other hand with regard to this
ínterpretation of probability. The Neyman-Pearson approach deals with the
risk of taking decísions, not with truly ínferential problems.
18 tJork in progress.17
as the data mining problem, but it xas already knoan to the early
econometricians. As noted before, Haavelmo spent a section on it. A quote
may be illuminating:
"In general, vhenever xe can establish that certain data satisfy
certain relationships, ue add something to our knouledge, namely a
restriction of the class of a priori admissible hypotheses. The real
difflculty lies in decíding whether or not a given relation is
actually compatible with the data: and the important thing to be
analyzed ís the reliabílity of the test by which the decision is
made, since we have to deal with stochastlc relations and random
variables, not exact relations.
From this point of view there is, therefore, no justified objection
against trying out various theoríes to find one which "fits the
data". But ob~ections may be made agaínst certain methods of testing
the fit." (1944, p. 83)
Haavelmo refers to the case where the set of a priori admissible
hypotheses, in hls terminology Clo, is not fixed but changes during the
specífication search: "41hat is not permissible Ss to let Clo be a funetlon
of the sample point." (op.cit.). Note that thls ls slmilar to the
Bayesian idea of coherence, due to De Flnettl (see Hill 1974). It also
supports Hendry's preference for testing from general to specific, vhere
IIo is the most general hypothesís one can think of. A problem for
strictly applying frequentist methods remains: the sampling distríbutíons
of the test statistics are usually not known if sequential tests are
performed.
Data miníng violates stríct Bayesian principles as well. Coherent
behaviour assumes the existence of a complete príor over all possible
models, whereas in reality some models suggest themselves only after
inspection of the data. Hence, a Bayesian researcher presents results
condltíonal on the model(s) under scrutiny, and has to entertain
non-dogmatíc priors if prior omnisclence is unavailable (see also Hill
1986). There exists no theory of scientifíc creativity: both Bayeslan and
Frequentíst theories fail in thís respect, as does any other philosophy.
6. Testing, Comparing and Appraising Rival Nodels
uhether Bayesian or frequentlst tools xere used Sn the lnferentlal18
stage, the researcher will try to end up with a favoured hypothesis,
which can be compared with a ríval hypothesis. We can use probabllity
methods to evaluate these hypotheses. But such evaluation ís remote from
questions líke "Is monetarísm superior to Keynesianism7". Statlstical
tools can be used to compare well deflned statistícal models, further
inference to less well defíned research programmes is only possible íf
researchers agree on the terms that define the relations between an 42i'
and the empirical model. Empirlcal support ís not the only criterion for
appraisíng theories, but it is an Smportant one. If both competíng
partles would agree that comparing ML and Al2 wlll give a definite answer
to the question posed above, we may obtain a direct test. Not yet a
crucial one: this would only be a limíting case for the event that all
probability mass would go to ~ust one of the two hypotheses. But the test
depends on the agreement between índividuals about the relevance of Al~
for ~~ , this agreement is a matter of taste and Judgment. Hence, theory
appraisal is a subjectlve matter, but agreement on the terms for
appraisal is possible. It primarily depends on agreement about the
valídity of statistical models.
The Friedman-Meiselman effort to test monetarism versus Keynesianism
was not accepted by Keynesians, because they disagreed that the Keynesian
theory was represented by a sound Keynesian hypothesis. Note, by the way,
how Fríedman and Meíselman characterized advanced statistical methods for
comparing theoríes:
"The evidence is so one-sided that its import ís clear without the
nice balancing of conflicting bits of evídence, the sophisticated
examínatíon of statístical tests of slgnificance, and the
introduction of supplementary ínformation that the economic
statistician repeatedly finds necessary in trying to decide
questionable points, and that Ss indeed a ma~or source of pride and
pleasure in his craft" (Frledman and Meiselman 1963, p. 186).
Not everyone agreed that the evidence was so one-sided. Md lt xas the
craft of economists using sophisticated statistlcal tools that showed
Frledman and Meiselman's approach was founded on a misspeclfled model.
The discussion turned into a debate on statistical testíng of competing
models.
As will be clear from the prevlous section, there are two general
approaches to the problem comparing or testing rival models: the19
frequentist and the Bayesian. It is not the purpose of this paper to
present a rígourous analysís of these two approaches (see e.g. Barnett
1973). Instead we concentrate on the baslc Sdeas Sn order to be able to
make clear what thís statistical literature may have to do with the
methodology of economics.
In the frequentist approach there are baslcally three dlfferent
strategies for testing rlval models: the embeddíng or comprehensive model
strategy, the generalized likelihood ratio strategy and the symmetric (or
equivalence) strategy. The comprehensive model is a nesting of the
competíng models in a more general, embeddíng model. More specifically,
let us assume that, after some experímentation and hypotheses testing,
two rival models resulted: A(1 and Mz. Assume both are linear models given
by:
M1: Y- XS1 t el , el - N(O,viI) (S.1)
t e e - N(O,vzI) (5.21 ~z ~ Y - ~z z ' z z
where X and 2 may or may not have some (not complete) overlap. Testing
these non-nested hypotheses can be done by regarding them as two
restrlcted forms of a more general model, the embedding model:
M: Y- XSl 4 2(3z f e~ (5.3)
The test now is to see if either b~ or bz are sígnlficantly different
from zero (using an F-test, for example). The test leads to some
diffículties, however. First, we may find that either bl or b2 is
signíficantly different from zero which seems to be an informative
result. It may happen, however, that a Jotni test on both bl and b2 leads
to a contradictory result. Secondly, it Ss not clear what should be done
if both or none of the restrictions are re~ected (if none of the
restríctions is reJected, then we are left with an embeddíng model in
which we are not per se interested). Thírdly, collinearity between
(subsets of) the rival regressors may decrease the power of the test
(Pesaran (1982) discusses different aspects of the comprehensive testing
approach).
An alternative to the comprehensive model approach is due to Cox (1961,
1962), who also inspíred Atkinson and MacKinnon to develop extensíons of20
the previous approach. Cox defines a test statistic:
Ti - Lr z - Ebl{Li zí (5.4)
where L1 z is the log-likelihood ratio, Eb (L1 2} is the expected value
1
(if M1 were true) of the difference between the sample log-likelihood
ratio given All and the sample log-likelihood ratio given ~ (the
likelihoods are evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates). Under the
null, T1 ís asymptotícally normal distributed. Note that the procedure is
asymmetric: in the case gíven above, the distributíon of the parameters
of MZ is evaluated conditionally on the truth of .N1 (M is called the
reference hypothesis). Hence, the inferential results may depend on
whether M1 or Mz is made the reference hypothesis. The motivation for
Cox's test was partly a dissatisfaction wlth the use of improper priors
in a Bayesian framework for model comparíson (see below for a
discussion).
The Cox-test showed up in econometrics around 1970 (see e.g. Gaver and
Geisel 1974, who refer to applicatíons by Dhrymes et.al. and Pesaran).
Hendry, Mizon and Richard use ít for their theory of encompassing (see
e.g. Mizon and Richard 1986). Encompassing is both used to compare rival
models, and to see whether a particular model is an adequate
representation of the data. We wlll concentrate on its application to
evaluating rival models. The method starts wlth the data generating
process. If the DGP were known, it would be possible to predict how
specifíc models would behave. Hence, if one model can predict the
behaviour of parameters of the other one, then a feature of the "true"
DGP is captured. Cox's test (or alternative non-nested hypotheses tests),
on which the encompassíng philosophy relies, is regarded as a statlstícal
tool that may be used to approxímate the DCP closer and closer. The
adherents of encompassíng relate thís to Lakatos's notion of
pr~pressiveness (Mizon and Richard 1986). Nhether this Ss really what
Lakatos had in mind may be questioned19, furthermore, there are some
19 Empirical progress according to Lakatos is the result of novel
theoretícal predictions whích turn out to be correct. Mízon and Richard
are writing about new interpretations of given data.zi
problems with regard to the idea of such scientífic progression (see
Feyerabend (1975, Ch. 15) for a strong critique on Lakatos's view on the
development of physics). Other críticisms on the encompassing methodology
are related to the evaluatíon of rlval theories at their maximum
likellhood estimates (the Bayesian would compare the complete densitfes),
and the problem of the choice of appropriate significance levels and the
level of power. The fact that two rival theorles may have dlfferent prior
probabSlíties should be part of an Snferentlal strategy as well.
E:ncompassing of MZ t,y M1 implies to interpret the parameters of ~
withln the context of M1. The parameters of Mz are lnterpreted as tf ~
Ss true (this gives pseudo true values for the parameters in M2, see
White 1982). If no information is lost by interpreting the parameters in
Mz as the pseudo true ones under M1, then ~ is said to encompass M.
Florens, Hendry and Richard (1989) extend the methodology of Mizon and
Richard (1986) to a Bayesian setting in which pseudo true values are not
needed.
A different frequentist approach to the problem of model choice is
presented in Vuong (1989) and for a more simple case in Llen and Vuong
(1987), who explicítly drop the assumptíon that either one or both models
should be "true" in the statistical sense (like Mizon and Richard, Vuong
relíes on pseudo-true values). Vuong's is the third strategy in the
frequentist domain, the symmetrtc or equivalence approach (which dates
back to work of Hotelling in 1940)20. In contrast to the other two
approaches, there is no implicit assumption that either one of the rival
models ís true, or that the embedding model is true. Instead, Vuong
provides a very general framework Sn which nested, non-nested and
overlapping models can be compared, with the possíbilíty that one or both
m~uCis may be mi~-specified. An information criterion is used (the
Kullback Leíbler Informatíon Criterion, KLIC), whích measures the
distance between a glven dístribution and the "true" distribution. The
ZO Th~il presented another symmetric "test", by showing that maximizing
the R corrected for degrees of freedom is equivalent to minimizing the
expected unexplained variance of the regression, whích would lead to
obtaining the correct model "on the average". For a discussion, see Gaver
and Geisel 1974, p.53.22
idea is "to define the "best" model among a collection of competing
models to be the model that is closest to the true distributlon" (Vuong
1989, p. 309). The advantage of generality is countered by a loss of
power to discriminate between the models, which together with the
computatíonal complications is a drawback of this approach.
The second methodology is based on the Bayesian perspectlve and
considers the problem as a decision-theoretic one, to which Jeffreys's
(1961) posterlor odds ratio's can be applied. Zellner (1971) and Gaver
and Geísel (1974) provide discussions of this application to comparing
models. The basic idea is very simple. Instead of applying Bayes's
theorem to infer about parameters, we now apply it to inference of
models. More explícitly: assume as before we have two models to compare:
Ail and M, with parameter vectors S1 and Sz respectively. The prior
probability density functions for these vectors are p(~1IM1), i-1,2. The
prior probabillties of the models are p(M1). These probabilities are




The posterior odds ratio for comparing the two models is:
POR -
p(Ml ~y) P(All ) .f P(Sl ~~ )P(y~Rl .M )dRi
p(Mz~y) P(Mz) ,I~ P(Rz~M )P(YIRz.~ )dsz
(5.5)
(5.6)
(see Zellner 1971, p. 298). The posterlor odds equals the prlor odds
times the ratio of the weighted or averaged llkellhoods of the two
models. The weighting is the result of the uncertainty about the
parameters S~ which underlies the basic philosophy of Bayesían Snference.
The frequentíst approach evaluates the likelihood ratío at the (maximum
likelihood) point estimates for ~~, the Bayesian evaluates the whole
posterior density for S~. Hence, 5.6 remains different from Vuong's
tests, even though Vuong drops the claim that any of his models may be
regarded as if they represent the truth.
The prior odds ratío is simply explained as one's betting ratio of23
model 1 versus model 2 before cor.sidering the evídence as provided by the
(new) data. If there is no a pr[ori reason to prefer one over the other
model, then the prior odds ( p(.H1)Ip( 2) ) may be set to one.
The second part of formula 5.6, called the Bayes Factor, is the ratio
of the marginal densities of y Sn the light of model 1(with parameters
(3~) and model 2(with parameters sz) respectively. Models 1 and 2 are the
competing models that are used as "windows" through which the data can be
seen. The Bayes factor reveals something of the quality of the windows.
If the prior confidence is very much ín favour of R~ and not Y!2 , and
you think the window provided by M1 is a priori satisfactory, your prior
odds will be high. But the data may force you to adjust your opinion: íf
the Bayes factor favours ál2 thís has to lead to a revísion of the prior
odds. A ratíonal researcher has eíther to revise the confidence in ~~ ,
or to adjust the research programme such that ít might be able to regaín
confidence. The comparison between the rival models is not a real test in
the sense that a decísion must be made about dropping one or the other
model. Instead, it ís a way to obtain information on the relative quality
of a model in a certain setting, this information may be used for further
ínference. The Bayesian view deals with learníng from data, this view is
partícularly useful in the context of appraising ríval theories.
An outright rejection of a research programme is not demanded from a
rational investígator. In this sense, the Bayesian approach is in
agreement with Lakatos's. The dífference is that Bayesianísm allows to
quantify, to a certaín degree at least, the otherwise vague notion of
"progress" and "degeneratíon". Let us see how this is done.
Say we have two competing theories (e.g. the permanent income
hypothesis versus the Keynesian consumptlon theory, for a treatment of
the former see e.g. the paper by Campbell 1987, quoted before), J1 and
7z. They are not static but develop over time, i.e. they are part of
competing research programmes. At a given poínt of time, J~ may
have a higher probability than J2, measured in posterior odds,
but it is possible that more progress is made around "JZ than Sn
the research programme of íts competitor. Let us assume that the theories
and experimental designs have resulted in two rival models, for example
linear regression models. For example, .N1 implies that temporary
fluctuations in current income do not matter for consumptíon behaviour,
whereas MZ ímplies a strong positive correlation. We can calculate the24
posterior odds for these models. They can be formulated according to 5.6
or more simply as:
POR -
P(Ah )'P(YI Ml )
PMZ 'PYMZ
Assume this ratio favours All, the permanent income hypothesis, POR Ss
bigger than one. The adherent of .HZ does not give up hís theory but
changes the theory by adding some additional arguments, d. For example,
he may introduce some dynamics in the Keynesian consumption function in
the form of an error correction specifícation. If these additions fit in
very well with álZ (i.e. have high prior probability given Mz, which
amount to say that the theoretícal innovation is not ad hoc in Lakatos's
first sense), and if they, together wlth Alz , lead to new empirical




piMZ~p(Y MZ,d)'p d ~
In other words, the odds change favourably to the second theory if the
additional or augmentive hypothesís ,4 has high probabllity given M(i.e.
given the environment of its research programme), and if AlZ and d jointly
predict the occurTance of data better than Mz itself did. Another way of
viewing this is to define Al2 and ,Q together as a new model, 3, and
calculate the posterior odds of the old versus the new instance of this
research programme. If the odds are bigger than one, the ínnovation is
"progressive". It will also lead to an improvement of the odds versus the
competitor, as straightforward calculation shows.
If the data are so outspokenly at odds with theory .HZ that the prlor
odds are blown away by the data information, and if no additlonal
hypothesSs can be thought of that is both likely in the context of this
theory and in the context of the data, than the opinlons of researcher of
rlval research proPrammes may converge towards M1. Sub,Jectlvlty (ln the
sense of dífferences of prívate opinions) vanishes Sn the llmit, where
one theory is true and the sample-size grows to infinity. In thís case,
the method of posterior odds and frequentist non-nested testing will lead25
to the same decision.
The Bayesian methodology (whether the posterlor odds approach, or the
encompassing approach as presented in Florens et.al. (1989)) has the
advantage that ít deals explicitly with uncertainty about parameters and
models. This is at the cost of analytical tractabílity: calculation of
5.6 can be cumbersome if informatíve priors are used, and may lead to
nonsensical results íf non-informative priors are used (see Gaver and
Geísel 1974). In fact, the latter implies that it is impossible to
evaluate rival models without any a priori information. Judging theories
only on ground of maxlmum líkelihood evaluation Ss as misleading as
calculating posterior odds based upon non-informative priors.
The foregoing discussion of frequentíst and Bayesian strategíes to
evaluate rival models would be of little interest if applícations were
absent. Most econometric research fits in the frequentist tradition,
hence most applications of testing rival models should be found here.
Indeed, quite a few applícations appear in the literature. Tests of
Keynesian versus New-Classical explanations of unemployment are presented
in McAleer et. al. (1990), who also provide references to non-nested
tests of investment models, income versus wealth in money demand
equations, and the choice of the appropriate interest rate in a money
demand function.
Applications of the Bayesian posterior odds are rare. NeftSi (1984)
uses POR's to answer the question "Are economic time series asymmetric?".
Geweke (1987) analyzes the cyclícal behavíour of real GDP and uses
posterior odds ratios to compare models with damped, oscillatory or
explosive behaviour. I am not aware of applicatlons to compare models
that belong to rival research programmes, even though ln such an
opp;icat:~n the Bayesian philosophy comes to its full attractiveness.
7. Conclusion
Haavelmo proposed to make better use of probabilistic underpinnings in
empirical economics. His major interest was in the simultaneous character
of economic models, but he also gave a number of interesting general26
methodological statements. In this paper, we tried to see if there is any
link between Haavelmo's claím that statistical work in economics needed
sound probabilistic foundations, and the problem of appraising economic
theories.
The first point of this paper is to emphasize the importance of
probability methods in economic inference. It ís sad that this should be
emphasízed, but methodologists have not shown much interest in this area
so far. Secondly, we showed how data might be informative on rival
economic theories. Furthermore, we analyzed some difflculties in
interpreting the results of statistical inference if "the" model is not
given, and compared frequentist and Bayesian alternatives.
Thirdly, it was argued that use of probabilistlc ínference in economics
involves subjectivity. This subjectivíty ís inevitable. Haavelmo (1944,
p. 3) already acknowledged the limitatíons of probabilistic inference:
"(...) it is not to be forgotten that they (our explanations7 are all
our own artificíal inventions ln a search for an understanding of real
life; they are not hidden truths to be "díscovered".
An artificial invention is man-made, by definition. It involves taste,
judgment and creativity. Decision criteria, such as the 95'I. significance
level, are matters of taste as well (the existing literature on optimal
choice of significance levels has a Bayesían spírit, like applications of
the principle of minimizing the maximum regret. The choice of the regret
function remains arbitrary (for a discussion see Amemiya 1985, p. 52-SS).
Rules of Bayesian Inference set bounds to the arbitrariness of model
selection or scientifíc progress.
The demand of (neo-) Popperíans for more testing in economics is
misguided if a proper foundation for probabilistic inference is not
provided ín the mean tíme. The Bayesían philosophy provides both a sound
theory of inference and guidelines for the use and interpretation of
probabilistic "tests" in econometrics. This conclusion has brought us far
from Lhc lnltial work of flaavelmo, but provides solutions to problems
that were raised already by Haavelmo and hls contemporaries, when they
defended the probabilistíc methodology in econometrics.27
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